



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

My difficulty is that in almost all cases this share is indeterminable, as Prof. Smart himself admits elsewhere (p. 110).

I should have much more to say if space allowed; as it is limited, conventionalities and terms of appreciation have been curtailed. This review proceeds on the assumption that Professor Smart's book is understood to be a work of high standing—in fact, one of the most important economic publications of the year.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

ENGLISH POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FROM HOBBS TO MAINE. By William Graham, M. A. London: Edward Arnold, 1899. 8 vo. Pp. xxx., 415.

Professor Graham has set himself two objects in composing this volume. The first object has been to "give a connected account within a moderate compass of the political theories of the great English political thinkers who have most influenced practice from the days of Hobbes." This part of his design Professor Graham has realized with a great degree of success. The political thinkers in question are Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Maine. They are selected, partly by reason of their influence on practice, partly because they "sufficiently illustrate the different schools of political thought," and still more because "they represent and exhaust the methods of discovering truth on the subject." These reasons may, with some qualification, be accepted as sufficient for the purpose in hand. The summaries given of the different "systems" of political theory are sufficiently full to concentrate attention upon the main and central ideas, as well as to constitute a useful guide and introduction to what is perhaps the most enduring and characteristic product of English thought. Professor Graham's appreciations are perhaps wanting in background and perspective: but he has a feeling for "temperament," and treats his subjects for the most part with sympathy as well as with respect. His criticisms, on the other hand, are somewhat rough, so rough as sometimes to throw out the sense of proportion which, as a rule, he succeeds in preserving. The eulogy of the "man" seems in some cases designed to give the author a freer hand in condemning the "thinker." This is conspicuously the case with "poor Mr. Mill," as Professor Graham, in effect, sums up the "thinker" as opposed to the "man" in Mill. Professor Graham is too much given to "sawing things asunder"; what,

after all, would Mill's political philosophy have been without his "idealism"? What Professor Graham regarded as a defect, is really the element of determinate value in Mill. The idealism which Mill imported into utilitarianism is often regarded as an inconsequence of theory; but it may also be said that there is a much deeper logic in Mill's utilitarianism than the logic by which he is generally measured. Professor Graham accounts for Mill's "comparative failure," partly on moral, partly on intellectual grounds: Mill had too much moral ardor, and intellectually he was "not original"; but it was just the combination of the moral and scientific elements in Mill which constituted his originality. Professor Graham describes the "System of Logic" as Mill's "greatest book;" but for the real strength and greatness of Mill, the student might be more fitly referred to the two essays on Bentham and Coleridge. The "humanity" and the peculiar philosophical temper of Mill may not compensate for his want of "original intuitions," or his failure to "discover" what Professor Graham is much too ready to acclaim as "new" truths, but they may account for his having been "formerly much read at the universities," and for the no little influence he has had on political thought. It is certainly curious that Professor Graham should praise Mill for his "logical acuteness," but it is not surprising that he should have missed the point of what acuteness it had, inasmuch as he at the same time regards Mill as a speculative dreamer of dreams. In the same way, Professor Graham hardly brings out the element of positive idealism in Bentham, the ideal of equality, expressed in the principle that every man should count for one and for no more than one. This ideal, interpreted as equality of consideration, was the really significant aspect of Bentham's political utilitarianism. Maine, again, is reproached for not combining the historical method with the theory of natural law: but where would have been the point of Maine, if he had?

But, apart from these defects, and the more serious, because more comprehensive, misreading of Rousseau (pp. 66-7), Professor Graham's reproductions, based as they are upon analyses of the original treatises, are sufficiently full and objective to be undeniably useful. On the other hand, the value of the book is, to my mind at least, greatly discounted by the political reflections of the author, and for that reason I cannot think that Professor Graham has succeeded in his second object—"by a measured criticism, to distinguish what is permanently true from what is

doubtful or erroneous, to disengage the former, and, as far as may be, develop it further, with the hope that finally from the exposition and criticism together something like an Introduction to Political Science might result, resting on authority and reason combined."

The "result" to which Professor Graham seems to point is (as already hinted) a combination of the truth of natural law (and natural justice) with the truth of the historical method. But the author, as far as I can see, has a somewhat crude conception of both truths, and the fusion only makes confusion worse confounded. I must content myself by quoting typical passages. The sense of justice which Professor Graham assures us is a sounder "ethical base" for jurisprudence than considerations of utility—it being "easier to find the first than what is conducive to the happiness of the greatest number (or even the weal of the social organism)"—is original and innate in human nature. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that some of its manifestations are exceedingly primitive and "natural" (to animals as well as man).

"It is instinctive; we are born with a predisposition to it, the result of heredity. It appears early in children, who in play with each other show their sense of it; and of the innate feeling of 'mine' and 'thine,' which appears much earlier. Certain phrases mark the early appearance of the notion of natural rights, and of the law of equality of rights in certain cases, 'I have as good a right to it as you have,' 'as good a right to be here as you have,' etc. Again immediate anger at wrong or injury done to them shows the instinctive sense of justice and injustice. They feel that certain acts are just and 'fair,' the contrary ones wrong and unfair. The instinctive notion of property which appears in the child is seen in developed form in the school-boy. The bird's nest that he first discovers is 'his' and so are the young, and both by the right of the first 'occupant,' " etc., pages 380 and 381.

The "attempt to follow natural law," it is not altogether surprising to hear, "might produce temporary widespread misery and anarchy": "to avoid anarchy, the doctrine of natural law must then give way to utility"; in any case, it must be held subject to the lessons of history. In what way, then, can the historical method come to the aid of a jurisprudence based on "the law of nature"?

"History shows what has always and everywhere been held as just, and which, as giving the long experience of our species, must now be considered as necessary."

Now for the person. "It is the historical method chiefly that teaches what *must be* and what has always and everywhere been, from universal and eternal (sic) experience. But it is the doctrine of natural law which shows what *ought* to be in general, in conformity with justice chiefly, but also with utility and necessity."

There is, therefore, "no necessary antagonism between the historical method and the theory of natural rights," and the result is that we are provided with a double-edged "weapon" in defence of "property" (which appears throughout to be a matter of great and not very discriminate concern to the author), for, "the doctrine of natural law" (after having deflected into a slight course of "perversion" in which it became "a weapon of attack on the richer classes") "is now the great defence of the natural rights of property, old as the world." The doctrine of natural law justifies private property as founded on natural rights, while the historical method shows it as a "universal and necessary" fact. Professor Graham has not indicated at what point "the moral sense or sense of justice" ceases to be merely natural, and what is involved in the transition, and, on the other hand, he has not shown us at what point the experience of the race is sufficient to make "what has been" the standard of "what must and will be," at what point "the sense of justice" which each of us has "as part of his moral nature" ceases to have any validity. Still less does he give any clear account of the ultimate standard by which a possible conflict of "principles" can or should be adjusted.

"History has always shown the necessity and universality of our present system of contract and property. Bentham has shown that both conduce to the general happiness, save as respects the law of inheritance, and that anarchy and chaos would result from the abolition of property; but the theory of natural law alone can show that property and contract conform in their essence to the principles of justice, though abuses may creep in, so that things have been made property that ought not to have been so made, and unjust contracts have been permitted and enforced which it should be the business of equity and wise and just legislation to correct."

Does not this passage (apart from the wonderful see-saw of

points of view it suggests) show the futility of arguments directed to establish the justification of rights of "property" in the abstract. But Professor Graham's argument moves most freely in the region of general and absolute statements. Collectivists and communists are lumped together as persons desirous "at a bound apparently" to "abolish private property and inequality"; "it would not be easy," we are told, again, "to hold the belief in socialism and sociology simultaneously"; "a return to the primitive communism is so far from unthinkable that it is the goal of collectivists." Wholesale and question-begging statements of this kind are much too abundant in what purports to be an introduction to Political Science, unless Political Science is to be regarded, like so many other truths, as a closed revelation. For Professor Graham is not afraid even to suggest that finality has been reached, not only as to a condemnation of socialism, but as to the work of statesmen, savants and soldiers.

"We are perhaps within reasonable distance of the time when science will be complete, philosophy finished, and when 'the war-drum will throb no longer,' when in consequence neither the creative savant, original philosopher, nor the soldier of genius will be longer or even possible for want of sphere."

We are also nearing the issue "when Biblical criticism has said its last word." "We know all the possible directions within which progress or effort is possible," and apparently still more surely the directions within which it is "impossible." The kind of confident generalization and sweeping statement in which Professor Graham indulges only serves to discredit the cause which his book is designed, and in many ways admirably designed, to advance—the cause, that is, of reason and knowledge as applied to political problems. Apart from evidences of rough and hasty thinking, the book shows signs of haste in composition: clerical errors are too frequent, and the writing sometimes careless; the analytical table of contents is very useful, but it hardly excuses the absence of an index.

Professor Graham's book is so good that it might very well be much better, and it would have been much better if the author had been less disposed to regard his own "philosophy" on these subjects as "finished." But Professor Graham has really provided the best antidote to political dogmatism in the exposition he has given of "the greater English political thinkers"; and, whatever defects any "higher criticism" may find in the *apparatus criticus*,

no one can fail to recognize the merit and the value of a book which is certainly the completest, as it is also the most convenient introduction to English political philosophy that exists.

SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Arthur Kenyan Rogers, Ph. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. viii., 360.

There can be little doubt that at the present time an introduction to philosophy is a desideratum. Anyone, therefore, who seeks to supply this need in philosophical literature should meet with a welcome not merely from teachers of philosophy or students beginning work in the subject, but from that wider public which finds philosophy more or less of an intellectual necessity.

It is the ostensible intention of Dr. Rogers in the volume before us to meet in some measure this want. Writing apparently as a teacher of philosophy and with a broad and living interest in its problems, he has, perhaps, the best equipment for such an undertaking. But it is not easy frankly to congratulate him either on his appreciation of the difficulties of his task or on the specific manner in which he has sought to carry it out. An introduction, no matter how brief, should primarily introduce. Dr. Rogers has throughout concentrated his attention mainly on criticism. A few representative problems and points of view, which have appeared in modern metaphysics (though certainly not for the first time in the history of philosophy) have been selected, and passed under a short critical review. But it is obvious that criticism deals with results, not with beginnings, leads away from what is discussed, and not up to it, as an introduction should. The author is so eager to bring forward objections and difficulties that he scarcely takes time to give a sufficient, not to say sympathetic, statement of the subject he wishes to discuss. The consequence is that he really presupposes on the part of the reader a knowledge of the ideas and principles he deals with, and even considerable insight into the meaning of the problems involved; and thus writes not so much for the philosophically uninitiated as for those who have already made some acquaintance with the subject.

To come to details. Any author is of course at liberty to